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| 6 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
| 7 | FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA |
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| 9 | SHEARWOOD FLEMING, No C 05-3564 VRW |
| 10 | Petitioner, ORDER |
| 11 | V ORDER |
| 12 | ANTHONY KANE, |
| 13 | Respondent. |
| 14 | / |
| 15 | BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, |
| 16 | Real party in interest. |
| 17 | / |

Petitioner Shearwood Fleming has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC section 2254. Doc # 1. According to the petition, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder for his role in a homicide that occurred in 1980, when he was twenty years old. Ptn at 9-10. He was sentenced in the superior court for Los Angeles County to a term of fifteen years to life with a two-year enhancement for use of a handgun. Id at 10. incarcerated at Soledad Correctional Training Facility in Monterey Id at 9, 23. The petition does not allege that petitioner has presented the claims of the petition to the state courts.

For the Northern District of California

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The gravamen of the petition is that petitioner has sought parole on several occasions beginning in 1990 but has been denied parole on each occasion. The most recent parole hearing, the one specifically challenged by the petition, was on July 29, 2002. at 15. Petitioner alleges that he has participated in numerous programs available to him in prison, earned his high school equivalency certificate, developed marketable skills through prisonbased vocational training and matured emotionally. Ptn at 7-8, 12-He alleges that the stated justifications for denial of his 13. parole were legally insufficient in light of the terms of his plea agreement and in light of his subsequent personal and vocational accomplishments.

The court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 USC § 2254(a); Rose v Hodges, 423 US 19,21 (1975).

A district court shall "award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto. 28 USC § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. <u>Hendricks v Vasquez</u>, 908 F2d 490, 491 (9th Cir 1990) (quoting Blackledge v Allison, 431 US 63, 75-76 (1977)).

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr

orthern District of California

| <pre>Complex, 442 US 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme, if</pre> | |
|---|--|
| it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole | |
| release will be granted when or unless certain designated findings | |
| are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally-protected | |
| liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v Allen, 482 US 369, 376-78 | |
| (1987) (Montana parole statute providing that board "shall" release | |
| prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process | |
| liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz , 442 US at 11-12 | |
| (Nebraska parole statute providing that board "shall" release | |
| prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process | |
| liberty interest in release on parole). In such a case, a prisoner | |
| gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied | |
| without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482 | |
| US at 373-81; <u>Greenholtz</u> , 442 US at 11-16. | |
| | |

California's parole scheme uses mandatory language and is largely parallel to the schemes found in <u>Allen</u> and <u>Greenholtz</u> to give rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal Penal Code § 3041(b). Accordingly, under the framework of Allen and Greenholtz, "California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole." McQuillion v Duncan, 306 F3d 895, 902 (9th Cir 2002). The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are made. Id. This is true

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regardless of whether a parole release date has ever been set for the inmate, because "[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate." Biggs v Terhune, 334 F3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with 15-to-life sentence implicated prisoner's liberty interest).

For good cause shown, the court now orders as follows:

- The clerk shall serve by certified mail a copy of this order and the petition and all attachments thereto upon the respondents and the respondent's counsel, the Attorney General of the State of California. The clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on the petitioner's counsel.
- 2. Respondent shall file with the court and serve upon the petitioner, within sixty (60) days of the issuance of this order, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file with the answer a copy of all portions of the state trial and appellate record that have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition.
- If the petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with the court and serving it upon the respondents within thirty (30) days of his receipt of the answer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge